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In South Africa, the private healthcare funding industry is 
under enormous pressure to fund delivery of medical care to its 
beneficiaries. We consider the effects, if any, different funding 
models have on medicolegal liability of health professionals, and use 
a detailed example in ophthalmology to clarify the position of health 
professionals.
Funding models fall into three categories: pure fee-for-service 
arrangements, global fees and capitation.1 Fixed salaries, as in the 
public sector, might be included as a fourth, with unique medicolegal 
implications for doctors.
In fee-for-service arrangements, as in the private health care 
industry in South Africa, doctors are remunerated purely for 
what they do for a patient. What is not done has no direct and 
immediate financial implications for the patient, and the doctor 
takes responsibility for what is done or omitted.1-3 The doctor can be 
seen as having the widest level of medicolegal liability. Ideally, purely 
medical reasons should determine the service rendered. However, the 
financial implications of the service rendered and defensive medical 
practice due to the threat of litigation also contribute strongly to the 
extent of a patient’s treatment and the remuneration thereof.4
Global fees are an intermediate arrangement where treatment for 
a particular condition is ring-fenced, and the total remuneration 
for such treatment is predetermined. After delivery of the service, 
the total amount is paid to the doctor, who in turn carries all the 
downstream costs. This arrangement shifts financial risk from the 
funder to the service provider,1,2 e.g. the contract ophthalmologists 
have with Transmed to deliver cataract surgery to Transmed 
pensioners outside the fee-for-service arena. Surgeons are paid the 
global fee, from which they must pay the hospital (theatre), the 
anaesthetist, and for the disposable items and intra-ocular lenses 
used. The surgeon determines the level of care such as the type of 
lens used, prophylactic and postoperative antibiotic cover and the 
type of anaesthetic (local or general). The total remuneration is 
predetermined, and the practitioner decides what to do. 
In the capitation funding model, a service provider takes 
responsibility for a defined group of patients and commits to 
delivering a predetermined set of services within a particular time for 
a predetermined ‘lump sum’.1,3-5 An example is the Centre for Diabetes 
and Endocrinology (CDE) programme for the care of diabetics, in 
which a medical practitioner is paid a particular amount for the care 
of a defined group of diabetics. The scope of this treatment typically 
includes annual visits to a podiatrist, dietician and ophthalmologist 
(for screening for diabetic eye disease). The medical practitioner 
remunerates the other service providers, such as the ophthalmologist, 
only for the service requested.
The dilemma
In the forms supplied to the ophthalmologist for the screening, the 
examiner must document, for example, whether an eye is normal 
or not, and has cataract or glaucoma or not. If, for example, the 
patient did not have diabetes mellitus (DM) retinopathy and this was 
documented, but had some other sight-threatening condition that 
was not addressed because the aim of the examination was purely 
DM screening, what would the ophthalmologist’s ethical and legal 
responsibility be?1,4 Should the doctor refer the patient for further 
diagnostic and curative therapy, must treatment be commenced, 
although not included in the capitated fee? Should the patient present 
with an acute condition at the time of screening, would it not be 
essential for the doctor to commence definitive treatment?
Ophthalmologists’ dilemma is that their medical acumen precludes 
this compartmentalised approach. They are simply remunerated to 
determine the presence or absence of diabetic eye disease, but their 
medical ethical codes require taking responsibility for the total care 
of the patient. This includes problems other than pure diabetic eye 
disease, which raises the question of the limits of liability. Would 
doctors not reacting to a medical problem outside the funder’s 
mandate be deemed negligent? And if so, could they argue that the 
limits of their liability are indeed determined by the funding model 
in which care took place? 
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Economic factors and financial pursuits can reshape the attitudes 
and expectations of healthcare professionals whose roles and 
responsibilities have in the past been clear and well understood.4 
‘Professional integrity can easily become tainted when the nature 
of the practitioner-patient relationship becomes transactional and 
patients are viewed as customers and healthcare as a commodity.’6
Legal and ethical framework
The most authoritative statement of the test for negligence in our law 
is found in Kruger v Coetzee, 7 namely that a defendant is negligent if 
a reasonable person in his position: (i) would foresee the possibility of 
his conduct causing damage to another; and (ii) would take reasonable 
steps to guard against such occurrence, and the defendant failed to 
take such steps. Obviously this general test for negligence cannot 
be applied when considering the conduct of an expert, such as a 
medical practitioner. A reasonable measure of the relevant expertise 
is therefore added, and the test used will be that of the so-called 
reasonable expert.8 The common law in South Africa describes 
reasonable and acceptable medical practice as follows: ‘In deciding 
what is reasonable the court will have regard to the general level of skill 
and diligence possessed and exercised at the time by the members of 
the branch of the profession to which the practitioner belongs.’9
This can also be stated in another way: a doctor will generally 
not be considered negligent if his/her actions would be accepted as 
proper by a responsible body of medical professional opinion. The 
courts will not, however, consider a body of opinion responsible if 
that opinion is not capable of withstanding logical analysis.10
A greater degree of skill is expected of a specialist than a general 
practitioner.9 A patient may successfully sue the ophthalmologist 
if it can be proved that his/her conduct was negligent in the 
circumstances, that is, that a reasonably competent ophthalmologist 
would have foreseen the likelihood of harm and would have taken 
steps to prevent its occurrence.11 In the UK it is stated that a 
doctor will be liable for negligence if he/she breaches his/her duty 
of care towards the patient, who is harmed as a result thereof. An 
ophthalmologist may, therefore, be found negligent if the screening is 
careless, imprudent or unprofessional.
In a lawsuit, the defendant doctor is required to provide evidence, 
from the medical literature and/or in the form of expert evidence, 
that the way the screening is done is acceptable and effective.12
These cases often end up in a battle of experts. Experts for the 
plaintiff will try to prove that the defendant’s conduct deviated 
grossly from the standard practice. On the other hand, experts for 
the defendant doctor will try to demonstrate that his/her conduct 
was in accordance with what other doctors are doing, and therefore in 
accordance with ordinary protocol.13 The court will apply a legal test 
and not one that may be decided by the particular profession.12 The 
Supreme Court of Appeal in South Africa emphasised that, although 
the court will pay much attention to the evidence of the professional 
experts, it is not bound to adopt them. Ultimately, it is for the court 
to decide what is reasonable in the circumstances.10,14
The common law position is further complemented by the ethical 
rules and guidelines of the Health Professions Council of South Africa 
(HPCSA). Court findings will inevitably be strongly influenced by 
these rules and guidelines, as will conduct enquiries by the HPCSA.
The following guidelines have been adopted concerning the 
example of the ophthalmologist who must decide whether to take 
responsibility of the total care of the patient, or to simply do what the 
medical fund pays for:
•	 What are the likely consequences of each option?
•	 What are the most important values, duties and rights, and 
which weighs the heaviest?
•	 What are the weaknesses of the health care practitioner’s 
individual view concerning the correct option?
•	 How would the health care practitioner want to be treated 
under similar circumstances, i.e. apply the Golden Rule, namely 
primum non nocere: ‘First do no harm’. 
•	 How does the health care practitioner think that the patient 
would want to be treated in the particular circumstances?15
Additional core values and standards for good practice are that 
health care practitioners should act in the best interests of patients even 
when this conflicts with the practitioners’ self-interest. Furthermore, 
‘health care professionals should refrain from withholding from their 
patients any information, investigation, treatment or procedure the 
health care provider knows would be in the patient’s best interest’.15
Legislation also prescribes proper conduct of health care providers 
relevant to the problem posed above. The National Health Act16 
(section 6) states that the ophthalmologist must inform the patient of 
the range of diagnostic procedures and treatment options generally 
available to the patient, and the benefits risks, costs and consequences 
generally associated with each option.
Patients also enjoy the protection of the Consumer Protection 
Act,17 which regards patients as consumers and physicians as service 
providers and introduces a different standard relating to the type of 
risk that must be disclosed. Section 58 creates an obligation on the 
supplier/service provider (healthcare professional) to specifically 
forewarn the patient of any risk of unusual nature or risk that 
could lead to serious injury or death or risk that the patient cannot 
reasonably be expected to be aware of. If the Consumer Protection 
Act conflicts with other concurrent legislation, the Act offering the 
greater protection will apply. Generally speaking, however, protection 
afforded by health care legislation is so specific and detailed that it 
affords better protection to the patients than that provided for in the 
Consumer Protection Act. An exception is probably the strict liability 
created in section 61 of the Act, which comes into play when the 
health care practitioner uses a defective product to treat the patient.
 ‘The ethical and moral duties accorded to health practitioners 
impose an obligation of effacement of self-interest on the practitioner 
that distinguishes health practice from business and most other 
careers or forms of livelihood.’1
Conclusion
Ethical guidelines and legal prescriptions expect the following 
conduct from the ophthalmologist, when screening a patient in a 
capitation funding model environment:
•	 Deliver the predetermined set of services as requested by the 
funder.
•	 Should other sight-threatening conditions or any other health 
condition become apparent the patient should be informed 
thereof, together with any information including treatment 
options that would be in the patient’s best interest.
•	 Depending on the circumstances, the health care provider can 
either render the appropriate treatment, or refer the patient to 
a specialist, or to the public health sector, should a patient be 
unable to afford the recommended treatment.
Ophthalmologists failing to follow these three guidelines may be 
held liable. Of course health care providers can render services at 
discounted rates. According to section 48 of the Consumer Protection 
Act, the patient may not be subjected to unfair, unreasonable or 
unjust contract terms, which include an unfair price. The wise words 
from an anonymous physician in 1882 may be inspiring: ‘When in 
doubt what to charge, look around you (to what others charge), then 
upwards (God), then make out your bill at such figures as will show 
clean hands and a clear conscience.’18
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